In this paper we analyze a time series measuring the monthly flow of US tourists to Israel over the period [1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. We pay particular attention to the response of tourists to variations in the intensity the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, drawing a distinction between actual conflict intensity and the intensity with which the conflict is reported in the US television media. We find that different dimensions of the conflict affect tourists in different ways. For some (but not all) dimensions of the conflict, reported intensity matters more than actual intensity. JEL classification: L83; D89; M39
Introduction
This paper analyses the impact of the media on US tourist decisions about whether to travel to Israel. It draws on two strands of economic thought. The first relates to media influence on the perceived risk associated with potentially dangerous activities. Individual households may have imperfect information about the risks associated with, for example, eating certain kinds of food or visiting certain neighbourhoods. When information is costly, they may use the intensity of media coverage of a hazardous activity as an indicator of the level of risk involved, interpreting intense media interest as a sign of concern among those who are better informed. Alternatively, we might abandon strict economic rationality in favour of the psychological model of Tversky and Kahneman (1973) , in which the frequency with which events of a certain type come to mind conditions the perceived frequency of such events in everyday life. More intense media coverage of dangers increases their perceived frequency, regardless of the true risks involved.
1
The importance of the media in conditioning perceptions is well documented in several areas of economics and other social sciences. Criminologists have used household survey data to examine the extent to which the intensity of coverage of violent crime on television news channels affects the perceived risk of being a victim of crime. The hypothesis that the television news media condition people's perceptions -know as "cultivation theory" -dates back to Gerbner and Gross (1976) . Recent studies provide substantial evidence for the importance of news coverage of crime in conditioning perceptions. Romer et al. (2003) analyse data from the US General Social Survey to show that individuals' perceptions of the frequency of crime, conditional on a range of socio-economic characteristics, depend not only on actual crime in their locality, but also the intensity of crime reporting in the local television media. This evidence is reinforced by more detailed surveys of individual cities, showing that people watching more television news perceive there to be a higher level of violent crime, ceteris paribus (Romer et al., 2003; Gross and Aday, 2003; Chiricos et al., 1997) .
The focus of attention in criminology is on respondents' self-reported perceptions of risk. There is, as far as we are aware, no evidence on the extent to which television reports of violent crime affect people's behaviour. However, there is econometric evidence that media reporting of health risks has a direct impact on consumer behaviour. Verbeke and Ward (2001) analyse time-series data on Belgian meat consumption during the period of the BSE crisis; they show that demand for beef was highly sensitive to time-series variations in the intensity of media reports about the risk of BSE. Other studies reporting a significant media effect on demand for food during health scares include Mazzochi (2004) and Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2004) . In some papers, for example, Piggot and Marsh (2004) , the authors note that the media effect is economically and statistically significant, but short-lived.
One interpretation of these results is that media reports produce a Tversky-Kahneman effect, but one that lodges only in people's short-term memory. However, the results are also consistent with rational consumers who assume that journalists are better informed about short-term variations in the level of risk.
The second strand on which we draw (a large part of which is reviewed by Frey et al., 2004) relates to the economic consequences of violent conflict. Much of the politically motivated violence in the modern world takes the form of low-intensity conflict which might not disrupt economic production in any substantial way. However, it can still have substantial demand-side effects, especially when tourism is a major export industry, with consequences for the financial sector (Eldor and Melnick, 2004) . Evidence for the effect of political violence on the tourism sector is reported in Enders and Sandler (1991) for Spain, Enders et al. (1992) for Austria, Italy and Greece, Drakos and Kutan (2003) for Greece, Israel and Turkey and Sloboda (2003) for the USA. In related work, Drakos (2004) examines the effects of 9/11 on various airline companies. One paper that focuses explicitly on Israel is Fleischer and Buccola (2002) . This paper shows that foreign demand for tourist accommodation is particularly sensitive to violence in the region, whereas local demand is quite insensitive; these effects are reflected in local financial markets.
Such papers provide rigorous and compelling evidence on the effects of political violence on tourism. However, they leave one key issue unresolved. To the extent that they employ accurate measures of conflict intensity, rather than the intensity with which the conflict is reported by the popular media, they do not directly address the role of the media in conditioning perceptions of risk.
2 In order to analyse the role of the popular media, we need to distinguish between the impact of actual violence on tourists' decisions and the impact of reported violence, as in the criminology literature. Our paper addresses this issue using monthly tourism and conflict intensity data for Israel during the most recent IsraeliPalestinian conflict (the Al Aqsa Intifada, beginning in October 2000), and corresponding television media data from the United States. While not a full-scale civil war, the Intifada represents a continuous ongoing conflict, rather than a series of isolated conflict events.
The Structure of the Empirical Model

3
Appendix 1 explains the choice-theoretic framework from which we derive the regression equations used to test hypotheses about the causes of monthly variations in the volume of tourist flows from the US to Israel. Our regression equations are of the form: The hotels data are available from January 1996, and Figure 1 depicts the ln(TIS t /TEU t ) series constructed using these data for the period January 1996 -June 2006.
(The figure also incorporates some trend lines to be discussed later.) It can be seen that there is a pronounced dip in ln(TIS t /TEU t ) after the onset of the Intifada in October 2000, but that
Israeli tourism slowly recovers toward the end of the sample period, when there is some diminishment in the intensity of the conflict. It is not clear whether this time series is stationary; stationarity test statistics are discussed in the next section.
Figure 1 and Table 1 here
In the results section below, we present five alternative models, each incorporating a slightly different set of variables in the X vector; the full list of models is presented in ). These four series are depicted in Figure 2 . It can be seen from Figure Table 2 here Model 2 is a minor modification of Model 1. Because we are using logarithmic transformations, a model with reported and non-reported fatalities is not identical to one with reported and total fatalities. In order to check whether our results are sensitive to this difference, Model 2 replaces the two non-reported fatality series with one for total Palestinian fatalities, ln(1 + PAL), and one for total Israeli fatalities, ln(1 + IFK). In the absence of any cultivation effect, the reported fatality series should be statistically insignificant in this model. . If the number of fatalities in a particular attack is perceived by potential tourists to be largely a consequence of chance, then the number of fatalities matters less than the number of attacks.
There are two obvious omissions in Models 1-5. First of all, we do not disaggregate according to both the location of the attack and the type of attack. As can be seen in Table 2 above Palestinian sharpshooter managed to kill 10 Israelis, including seven soldiers at this checkpoint, and then he got away."
The report is specific about the total number of Israeli casualties, but vague about the proportion occurring in the West Bank and Gaza, and about the proportion occurring in suicide bomb attacks. We cannot use this report to construct a precise disaggregation of Israeli fatalities, and nor could the potential tourists who originally watched it.
Regression Results
Stationarity test statistics
Any inference based on critical values in the regression results depends on establishing the stationarity of the time series depicted in Figures 1-2 . In testing the null that the time series are I(1) against the alternative that they are stationary, we must deal with two complications. In testing for stationarity we take a two-pronged approach. For the dependent variable we apply the method of Leybourne et al. (1998) 
The two fitted smooth transitions are depicted in Figure 1 above. Tables 3-5 here
The fitted model
Our main results are presented in Table 5 , which lists the steady-state regression coefficients in each of the five models, that is, the vector β (1) Given the absence of a significant media effect in the impact of Israeli casualties, there does not seem to be a strong case for arguing that cultivation theory is relevant to television reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Still, reports of Palestinian casualties do have a large and significant impact; altogether, this suggests that viewers are generally rational and well informed, but rely on journalists' judgement to indicate which events involving Palestinian casualties are politically significant.
Dynamics and model simulation
Rather than discussing the individual regression coefficients in Appendix 2 in detail, we illustrate the dynamic properties of our regressions in Figure 3 . This figure depicts results implicit in the full sample version of Model 5, but not results from other model. However, the stylized facts discussed here also apply to the other models. The three charts in Figure Table 6 here
We also test whether the addition of reported violence series from other news channels makes a significant difference to our results. There are some differences in the reporting of the violence across the three major channels. may reflect the viewing habits of potential tourists: perhaps they take a particular interest in the channel that provides the most detailed information about the conflict (the ABC), or in local channels taking news feed from the ABC. The theoretical model of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) shows that a rational Bayesian consumer will give more credibility to a media source when it confirms her prior expectations. If potential visitors to Israel have a prior belief that it is a dangerous place, then they may well pay particular attention to media outlets that
give the highest profile to the violence there.
Finally, we test whether retrospective reports of the violence have an impact on tourist figures. Sometimes, the same fatalities are reported on more than one occasion, or a report will mention the total number of fatalities over the last few months or years. Such reports are relatively infrequent: in the case of World News Tonight, retrospective Palestinian deaths are reported in only 11.4% of the months, and retrospective Israeli and foreign deaths in only 8.8%. Adding these retrospective fatality series to Models 1-5 does not produce significant coefficients on the extra variables, and the size and significance of the other variables is largely unaffected. Retrospectively reported fatalities constitute a broad, somewhat heterogeneous category, and it is possible that greater disaggregation would produce some significant coefficients. However, with so few non-zero observations in our sample, it would be difficult to disaggregate further without a serious risk of spurious results from data-mining.
Conclusion
Analysis of time-series and cross-sectional Israeli tourist data reveals some of the factors driving people's attitudes towards the risk associated with travel to a conflict region. Timeseries analysis of tourist flows from the United States shows that since the onset of the Intifada variations in conflict intensity have affected tourist volumes. These results reinforce previous studies of the wider macroeconomic impact of the Intifada, for example Fielding (2003) and Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) . As a consequence, we can expect even a partial reduction in violent conflict in the region increase tourism revenue. As returning tourists boost local incomes they may create stakeholders in the continuation of the peace process.
This could be grounds for optimism regarding a gradual resolution of the conflict.
We find that different dimensions of the conflict have heterogeneous effects on tourist flows. There is also heterogeneity with regard to whether it is the actual or reported intensity of a certain dimension of the conflict that matters. An increase in the frequency of actual Israeli casualties reduces tourist numbers substantially; conditional on these figures, attacks reported on network television channels make no significant difference. By contrast, it is the reported number of Palestinian deaths -not the actual number -that causes a decline in tourism. Further disaggregation of casualty figures (for example, by location or by the type of attack) indicates that attacks of all kinds have a substantial impact on tourist numbers. It is possible to square this result with a model of economically rational tourists: for example, tourists could rely on the qualitative judgement of journalists to inform them which conflict events are the most politically significant. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate that television has a substantial impact on economic behaviour.
Notes
1 As acknowledged in Brück and Wickström (2004) , such psychological effects are likely to be particularly important when we are modelling people's responses to risks to life and limb. 2 By contrast, Burger and Sturm (2005) construct a model of the German macro-economy conditional on the number of German television media reports of conflicts around the world.
However, they do not compare this with a model using actual data from the conflicts that are partially reported. 3 The regression specification here with is similar in spirit to that of Fleischer and Buccola (2002) , who analyze total foreign demand for Israeli hotel accommodation up to 1999 as a function of a single "terror index", but differs from their model in points of detail. We do not find any significant coefficient on economic variables in our regression equation. 4 NY = 1 if either Rosh Hashanah or Yom Kippur occur in the month; otherwise NY = 0.
5 One disadvantage of the data that we use is that they include business visitors in the total, and this should be noted as a caveat. There are no appropriately disaggregated data available at a frequency higher than once every two months. 6 The B'Tselem data do not cover violence along the Lebanese border, but this area does not attract such a large proportion of the foreign tourist market as it does of the domestic one. is used, because it is collinear with the seasonal effects. 8 We also explored the effect of replacing our measure of the number of American tourists visiting Israel with the number of American tourist person nights (indicating the number of tourists in Israel times the number of nights they stayed); this time series is also available on the CBS website. The correlation between the two alternative dependent variables is 0.98. The results using the alternative dependent variable are very similar to the ones reported here; the main difference is in the ln(1 + PLK WNT ) coefficients, which are about 3-4 percentage points smaller, but still significant at the 5% level. Here we discuss the conceptual framework from which equation (1) in the main text is derived.
This follows a standard discrete choice framework, as can be found in, for example, Maddala (1983) . Our model concerns a population of American tourists who have already decided to take a vacation; now they are deciding where to go. Let the net utility an individual i derives from taking a vacation in location m ∈ {1,..., M} in month t be designated v imt . We will assume that each person's utility is of the form:
where μ mt is the average level of utility from visiting location m in month t for the vacationing population and u imt is an individual's idiosyncratic deviation from this average. Z mt is a vector of identifiable time-varying factors that impact on one's net utility from a vacation in a particular location, and ε mt is a stochastic term reflecting the unpredictable component of the average utility level. We further assume that individual i chooses location m in period t just if:
It can be shown (Maddala, 1983 ) that if for any two locations (m, n) the distribution of u imt is independent of that of u int , and if each has a Weibull distribution, then the probability of any one randomly selected individual choosing location m in period t is:
o r, in logarithmic form:
For a large population, the log-ratio of the number of people in period t visiting location m (p mt ) to the number visiting location n (p nt ) can therefore be written as:
Location m here is to be interpreted as Israel; location n is to be interpreted as Europe. If we know the functional forms of μ mt (.) and μ nt (.), then we can fit equation (A5) to time-series data. We assume that it is possible to find a linear specification such that:
where ε t is a linear function of ε mt and ε nt . We further assume that [Z mt -Z nt ] has three major components, as follows.
(i) Seasonal factors, which we will capture by a seasonally varying intercept. The seasonality in tourism demand in Israel is likely to arise partly from the weather, and partly from its desirability a place to be during specific religious festivals.
(ii) Cyclical variation that results from imperfect information about the relative enjoyability of Israeli tourist resorts. If some people know more than others about the quality of these resorts (for example, because they have been there before), then there is an information externality in their decision to go again. Such externalities are likely to create cycles of the kind modelled theoretically by Çelen and Kariv (2004) . We will capture this effect through the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, which according to the theory ought to have a coefficient in the interval [0, 1] , that is, the time series ought not to exhibit a unit root. Our simple linear model is an approximation to the theory. Nevertheless, the main point is that with imperfect information there are cycles resulting from herding behaviour, but the herding effect does not persist indefinitely.
(iii) The anticipated net disutility arising from violence in Israel. This net disutility is likely to be a function of the sense of personal threat facing tourists, but may also reflect political sympathy for one side or another in the conflict. Hence, those dimensions of conflict intensity related directly to the sense of threat may impact on tourist flows differently from those dimensions of conflict intensity that are related only to the sympathy effect. Further, we make no a priori assumption about whether tourists react to actual variations in conflict intensity or only to variations in the intensity of reporting by a particular television news show. Finally, we allow any cultivation effect from awareness of a particular dimension of the conflict (actual or reported) to impact on tourist flows with a lag. Hence, equation (A6) 
h st is a dummy for month s, PS t and NY t are Jewish holiday dummies and X t is a vector of different measures of actual and reported conflict intensity during the Intifada. Equation (A7) omits any measure of the relative cost of visiting of the two locations.
Data on hotel and restaurant prices in Europe and Israel are available, facilitating the construction of hospitality price real exchange rate series. However, such series are unlikely to be exogenous to total tourist volumes, and in this context there is no obvious instrument for ii hotel and restaurant prices. For this reason we tested for a relative cost effect using an aggregate consumer price real exchange rate. Specifically, we used the log of the ratio of the 
